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[48 C.2d

J11RAENKEI, V. 'rRESCONY

such award may institute proceedings . . . for the purpose of
determining an apportionment of liability or right of contribution." (Italics added.) In addition, as noted, it is only
upon a showing that those employers who have not contributed
to payment of the original award are "without the commission's jurisdiction, or are dead, insolvent, or not subject
to enforcement of awards against them for such contributions,'' that the right of reimbursement from the Fund arises.
As pointed out by the Fund, this showing would necessitate
proof which might not be available until it had been first
drtermined whether a particular employer or insurance company was or was not actually able to satisfy the award; i.e.,
attempted enforcement of an award might well be a reasonable element of such a showing.
ReRpondent commission urges, however, that petitioner has
not shown that the results would have been any more favorable to it if the contribution award against it had been issned
in proceedings separate from those in which the employe's
award was made. However, where the statutory provisions
giving rise to a right of contribution also provide the proeedure to be followed, it is fundamental that the commil'lsion
should conform to the legislative directive.
For the rC'asons stated the contribution award against petitioner is annulled and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the views herein expresRed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J., concurred.

[8. F. No. 19670.
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CARL 1VL :B'RAENKEf1, Appellant, v. ,J. G. TRESCONY,
Respondent.
[1] Licenses-Exemptions.-For a construction to be "incidental
to farming" within the meaning of the exemption of the Contractors' License Law (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 7049), the construction must be locatPd on a farm and must bP incidt>ntal to the
farnwr's own farming- opPrations.
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defined
[2] Words and Phrases--·"Farm.
as a tract of land used for
111·
one dPvoh'd to
dustry.
[3] Licenses-Exemptions.--\Vhile present-day farming may encompass the u~e of multiple scattered tJ·arts rather than a
parcel of land, still a structure "lo~atPd on a farm"
would rrasonahly Pnvisage location on land devotrd to agrieulture as commonly understood to mean on land used for the
raising of crops or pasture or both rather than location on
property sitnated in a predominantly industrial or commercial
sector of a town some miles from the actual farm on which
the crops are produced.
[ 4] Id.-Exemptions.-'U'rom the mere fact that a grain elevator is
designed primarily for the storage of a farmer's own farm
products, it does not automatically follow that it is thereby
"located on a farm"; it is only if the elevator was built on
defendant's farm and designed to function as an incidental
part of his own farming operations that there would be a
factual basis for holding it to be within the exemption of the
Contractors' License Law as a "construction or operation
incidental to ... farming."
[5] Id.-Exemptions.-To permit the farming exemption of the
Contractors' License Law to apply to construction work which
is not performed on a farm would run counter to the purposes
of such law enacted for the safety and protection of the
public respecting structural improvements to real property
wheTein special skill, training and ability are required.
[61 Id.-Exemptions.-In exempting construction "incidental to
farming" from the state licensing requirements, the Legislature did not intend to include every structure bearing a possible
J'('lation to the farming industry and without regard for its
location in relation to the farm, and the exemption should not
be extended to office buildings, warehouses, grain elevators or
similar structures constructed at sites far removed from the
farm and perhaps in the center of cities or towns, though such
facilities might be constructed for the sole use of a single
farmer in connection with his own extensive farming operations.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Conrt of the
City and County of San Francisco. ·william T. Sweigrrt,
,J ndge. Affirmed.
Action to recover balance due for the constrnetion of a grain
elevatm·. Judgment for defendant affirnwd.
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Carroll F'. Jacoby and Jack Flinn for Appellant.
John vV. Hutton for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff sought to recover the unpaid balance
allegedly due from defendant for the construction of a grain
elevator. Upon the ground that plaintiff failed to allege that
he was a licensed contractor (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031),
defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained
without leave to amend. Plaintiff appealed and the judgment
was reversed in order to afford plaintiff the opportunity to
amend his complaint to show that the construction work was
"incidental ... to farming" so as to avoid the state licensing
requirement. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7049; Fraenkel v. Trescony, 40 Cal.2d 905 [256 P.2d 573].) Plaintiff thereupon
amended his complaint and the case was tried upon the single
issue of whether the farming exemption applied. The trial
court found that it did not and therefore plaintiff's failure
to comply with the contractor's license law precluded his
recovery. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.) From
the adverse judgment accordingly entered, plaintiff now
appeals.
[1] At the trial the court and both parties treated the
holding in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845 [256
P.2d 569], a companion case on the first appeal, as stating
the governing principle: "that the construction must be
located on a farm and must be incidental to the farmer's own
farming operations in order to be 'incidental to farming,'
within the meaning of the exemption." (P. 849.) Consistent
with this interpretation of the statutory language, the trial
court's judgment, based upon its determination that the construction in question did not qualify under the farming exemption, must be affirmed.
Plaintiff, a licensed mechanical engineer, and defendant
entered into a written contract calling for plaintiff's construction of a grain elevator on a "cost plus ten per cent" basis.
The elevator was built on property owned by defendant in the
town of San Lucas. It was located on Main Street amidst
business buildings and homes on town lots and adjacent to the
Southern Pacific main line tracks. Nearby there were also
commercially operated grain sheds and storage bins owned
by another individual. The site for defendant's grain elevator was approximately 31j2 miles from defendant's farm and
its only access therefrom was by public road.
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The trial court found that the grain elevator was ''not constructed on a farm, either actually or constructively"; that
it "was designed with the intent that it would be usable primarily for the defendant's own produce, but also for the storage of the grain of others on a rental basis''; and that such
structure was ''incidental to both farming and commercial
operation by the defendant.'' In line with these findings that
the grain elevator was not located on a farm and was to be
used to some extent for commercial purposes, the court concluded that the statutory farming exemption was of no avail
to plaintiff and, in the admitted absence of the required contractor's license, plaintiff could not recover.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not support the
above findings except that portion declaring that the primary
purpose of the grain elevator was for the storage of defendant's own produce. In this regard, he cites these undisputed
facts: that the size of the grain elevator, 1,000-ton capacity,
was determined from the acreage and past harvests of defendant; that any excess storage space would be available for rent
to others only in the event defendant should have a "short
season"; that in actual use the first year's storage consisted
of 800 tons of defendant's own grain and 200 tons on rental,
and in the next year's storage the respective amounts were
700 tons of defendant's own grain and 300 tons on rental; that
defendant did not have a warehouseman's license; and that
defendant financed the construction of the grain elevator
through a loan from the Commodity Credit Corporation with
the understanding that such loans were allowed only for the
purpose of erecting storage facilities for the farmer's own produce, and not for commercial or other purposes. Under these
circumstances, plaintiff distinguishes this case from Machinery
Engineering Co. v. Nickel, 101 Cal.App.2d 748 [226 P.2d 78],
where a hay processing mill "[a]dmittedly ... was not to be
connected with any particular farm as a part thereof, or used
in connection with any particular farm'' but was ''intended
to be a commercial enterprise ... to grind the hay of farmers
generally, located in the area" (pp. 751-752); and from California Emp. Corn. v. Bntte County etc. Assn., 25 Cal.2d 624
[154 P.2d 892], where a warehouse was owned by an incorporated cooperative association, the storage facilities were available alike to both members and nonmembers, and the association as so licensed was held "in essence a commercial enterprise
-a profitable pnblic warehouse bnsiness" (p. 636).
Plaintiff urges that since the construction of the grain ele-
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vat or was primarily for· the purpose of storage of defendant's
own produce, and defendant only contemplated the rental of
exeess storage space in an effort to operate his overall farming
rnterprise at maximum efficieney, the limited rental use wonld
not reasonably constitute the grain elevator a eommcreial
operation nor deprive it of its fundamental eharaeter as a
~-;tructure ineiclcntal to defendant's own farming.
However,
the merits of plaintiff's argnment ou this point need not he
here decided, for the record elcarly supports the finding that
the grain elevator was not "located on a farm" as required
for applieation of the exemption. (Fmenkcl v. Bank of America. SII[Jra, 40 Cal.2d 845, 850.)
Admittedly, the grain elevator was creeted on a town site,
whieh was approximately 31/z miles distant from defendant's
farm, and the only access between the two plaees ~was by a
pnblic road. The site was adjaeeut to the main railroad lim•s
servieing the tovm; other nearby property was industrial or
commercial in eharaeter rather than agrieultnral; and specifieally, the parcel of land adjoining defendant's town property
was oeeupied by a commen:ially operated grain elevator for
the usc of neighboring farmers. [2] A farm is generally
defined ''as a traet of land used for raising erops or rearing
animals--one devoted to agriculture, stoek raising or some
allied industry.'' (Board of Supervisors v. Cothran, 84 Cal.
App.2(l 679, 682 [191 P.2d 506] ; see also Jlagenburger v. City
of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App.2c1 161, 164 [124 P.2d 345] .)
[3] It is true that in keeping with modern methods and aclnlnecment in mechanized operations, present-day farming ma.v
enl'Olll pass the use of multiple scattered tracts rather than a
:-;ingle pareel of land, and the requirements for the efficient
fmwtioning of a large farming enterprise cannot be measured
in the light of farming (:onditions as they existed "a centnry
or more ago." (Irvine Co. v. California Emp. Com., 27 Cal.
2d 570, fi82 f Hi5 P .2rl 908].) But despite such ehanges in the
JHYvailing eoueept of a farming enterprise, still a strnrturP
'' loea t <'<l on a farm'' woulll reasonably envisage loeat ion on
land devoted to agril'ultnre as eommouly nnderstood to mean
<lll land used for "the raising of crops, or pasture, or both"
(3;) C .•J.S. p. 74G) rathPr than loeation on property situated
in a predmnimmtly iiHlnstrial or <'Ommereial sc,t'tor of a town
sOllH' miks from the adnal fm·m on whid1 thl' c-rops are
pro, lw·••d.
[4] Plaintiff a1·gw•s tl1ni since ddeJHlallt was a farmer
and the owm·r of a farm, and tlH' grain eleYator was designed
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primarily for the
own
such grain
elevator thereby beeame
of defendant's farm and was thus
''located on a farm." Sneh
completely eliminates
one of the two eoujundively required faetors of the farming
exemption as construed in lhaenkel v. Bank of America, supra,
40 Cal.2d 845, 849. B'rom the mere fact that the construction
is designed primarily for the storage of a farmer's own farm
produds, it does uot automatically follow that the construction
is thereby "located on a farm." As was said in Fraenkel v.
Bank of America, supra, at page 850, it is only ''if the grain
elevator was built on defendant's farm and designed to function as an incidental part of his own farming operations ...
[that] there would be a factual basis for holding such structure to be within the terms of the exemption as a 'construction
or operation incidental to . . . farming.' '' (Emphasis
added.)
[5] To hold otherwise, and permit the farming exemption
to apply to construction work which is not performed on a
farm, would seem to run counter to the purposes of the
contractor's licensing law enacted for the safety and protection of the public respecting structural improvements to real
property wherein special skill, training and ability are required. (Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 609 [204
P.2d 23]; llranklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d
628, 632 [204 P.2d 37].) [6] In exempting construction
"incidental to farming" from the state licensing requirements,
the Legislature manifestly did not intend to include every
structure bearing a possible relation to the farming industry
and without regard for its location in relation to the farm. It
therefore seems clear that the exemption should not be extended to office buildings, warehouses, grain elevators or similar structures constructed at sites far removed from the farm,
and perhaps in the center of cities or towns, even though such
facilities might be constructed for the sole use of a single
farmer in connection with his own extensive farming operations. Rather, it is only where the particular structure is
"located on a farm" and "designed to function as an incidental part" of the farmer's own farming operations (]i1 raenlcel v. Bank of America, supra, 40 Cal.2d 845, 850) that such
structure thereby reasonably becomes "dissociated from the
objects and purposes of the licensing law" (ibicl., p. 849) and
the farming exemption applies. Here the trial court found
from the evidence that the grain elevator was not constructed
''on a farm,'' and accordingly plaintiff, as an unlicensed con-
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tl'ador, ~was properly held to be precluded from maintaining
the present action.
'rhe ju(tgment is afiirmed.
Gibson, C. J ., Traynor,

J~.,

and McComb, J., concurred.

SCHA UETI, J., Dissenting.-In my view the majority opinion errs egregiously in holding, implicitly, that the defendant
by his own act, in concert with a third person, subseqnent to
the execution of the contract with plain.tiff, may retroactively
remler plaintiff's contract with defendant unlawful, and may
then invoke his own wrong to defeat plaintiff's right of
recovery after the latter's faithful performance of the contract. Such contract, on any reasonable view of the evidence,
appears to me to have been lawful when made, lawful in
object, and lmYful in performance. 'l'he only possibly unlawful dealing in connection ~with it appears to have been defendant's conduct in renting to third persons a portion of the
completed elevator storage space and thereby and to that
extent apparently engaging in a commercial rather than a
strictly farming activity. The principal question argued on
appeal is ·whether the work called for by the contract comes
within the fanning exemption created by Business and Professions Code, section 7049, hereinafter quoted.
For a clear comprrhension of the legal problem involved,
the salient facts of the controversy should be borne in mind.
At all times concerned plaintiff has been a ''registered professional engineer,'' skilled in the design and construction of
grain elevators, but not "licensed as a contractor." Defendant is engaged in farming some 5,000 acres of land. Plaintiff
contracted with defendant to ''prepare plans, blueprints and
specifications for a grain elevator and storage facility of an
approximate capacity of 800 tons of barley," to "sub-contract
for the customer'' certain specified work, to ''furnish all machinery, equipment and materials,'' and to ''inspect and
supervise all \York performed by others and to furnish a
superintendent." The basis of plaintiff's compensation was
to be "cost plus ten per cent." It is conceded (at this stage
of the litigation) that the terms of the contract bring plaintiff
within the definition of a contractor as that term is defined
in Business and Professions Code, section 7026, hereinafter
quoted. Sueh concession does not, however, establish that
the contract \Yas either unlawful or unenforcible, as will be
hereinafter shown.
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It is to be emphasized that the controlling issue before us is
not whether after completion of the structure defendant may
have put it to some unlawful use but is whether the contract
upon which plaintiff sues was lawful when executed.
The elevator was constructed on land owned by defendant
where it would be most efficient in defendant's farming operations; i.e., where it would not use up arable land of the main
agricultural tract and where it would be adjacent to a railroad so that the marketing of defendant's farm produce would
involve a minimum of handling. That the railroad's tracks
and nearest station happen to lie some 3% miles from the
land on which defendant's grain is grown does not appear
to me to be important. The important thing to the farming
operation is that the elevator be adjacent to the railroad
tracks and station. So located, the farm produce as harvested
could be picked up and transported directly to the elevator
for temporary storage and direct loading from it onto railroad
cars. The tonnage capacity for the elevator was determined
from defendant's acreage and past harvests. That fact, as
will appear from the law hereinafter developed, is consistent
with-and only with-an intention by plaintiff to use his
engineering and construction skills lawfully in contracting
with defendant to build an elevator to be used by defendant
in his farming operation.
It is not disputed that the primary purpose of building
the elevator >Yas the efficient marketing (temporary storage
and loading for shipment) of defendant's farm produce. We
may infer that defendant, intending to operate for the greatest
possible profit and to that end to pare losses in bad crop
years, had in mind also that, when his own crop was short,
he might derive some benefit himself-and possibly confer
some on neighbors-by renting surplus space. In actual use
it appears that the first year's storage consisted of 800
tons of defendant's grain and 200 tons on rental ; the next
year defendant required space for 700 tons and found rental
for 300 tons. But in my view the use to which defendant put
the elevator after its construction (as well as any secret
intention he may have harbored upon entering into the contract) is wholly immaterial in this litigation between plaintiff
and defendant. There is no showing that plaintiff in entering
into the contract with defendant had guilty knowledge of the
latter's unlawful intentions, if he then had any, as to use of
the completed structure.
This litigation is in itself strong evidence of defendant's
48 C.2d-13
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alertness and willingness to the end of tnrniug a tidy penny.
'rhe triat court found that the eoutrad prier of construdion
was $21,2;38.93; that dneing the r:omse of construction clefrnt1ant paid vlaintiff $8,97D.94, but has refused to pay any
part of thr balance. Defendant argues in support of his
refusal to pay--and the majority give his legal position their
judicial blessing-that the elevator is not located on defendant's farm, that since its construction defendant has used
it in some part for commercial rental as well as for hi» own
farming operations, that plaintiff is licensed only as a "professional engineer,'' that he does not possess a building contrm•tor 's license, and that therefore under certain provisions
of the Dnsiness and Professions Code plaintiff cannot require
defendant to pay for ·what he received.
The pertinent provisions of the Business and Professions
Code are as follows :
Section 7026 defines "contractor" as "any person who
undertakes to . . . construct . . . any building . . . or other
improvement . . . or other structures . . . ''
Sedion 7028 provides that "It ic; unlawful for any person
to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor
within this State ·without having a license therefor, unless
snch person is partic1tlarly exempted from the provisions of
tlt1·s chapter." (Italics added.)

Seetion 7031 pnwides that "No person engaged in the
business . . . of a contractor, may bring or maintain any
action in any court of this State for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which a
license is required by this chapter without alleging and
peoving that he was a duly lice11scd contractor at all times
during the performance of such act or contract."
Section 7049, how eYer, provides that "This chapter [which
contains the last qnotcd sections] does not apply to any construction or operation incidental to . . . farming, dairying,
agriculture, viticulture, horticulture . . . except \vhen performed by a lieensre under this chapter." Furthermore,
section 7050 provicles that the chapter "docs not apply to an
owner who contracts for a project ·with a licensed eontractor
or eontraetors" (sec also § 7030) and section 7051 declares
that such chapter ''does not apply to a licensed architect or
a registered ciYil or professional engineer acting solely in
his professional capacity .
" The majority expressed the
view (ill F'racnkcl v. Bank of AmcTica (] 9;)3), 40 Cal.2d 845,
848 [1] [256 P.2d 56D]) that sedion 7049 exempts "any
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construction or operation incidental to .
farming . . .
agriculture" but they now take the position that the marketing
of farm produce is not an incident of farming insofar as it
entails the use of a grain elevator which is not located on
the parcel of land on which the grain is grown. More specifically, the majority say that plaintiff's other arguments
"need not be here decided, for the record clearly supports
the finding that the grain elevator was not 'located on a
farm' as required for application of the exemption."
Regardless of the applicability of the other quoted sections
dealing with exemptions, it is my view that farming includes
marketing the produce of the farm, that a farmer should not
be penalized for operating efficiently, and that neither should
he be permitted-unless the law is altogether clear and compulsory to that end-to invoke the contractors' license law
in such a situation as this in order to achieve unjust enrichment. His defense here is an affirmative defense; he invokes
the statute to defeat what otherwise appears to be a just and
enforcible claim. Section 7050, hereinabove quoted, suggests
that if plaintiff has violated the law by entering into the
contract then so also has defendant, for defendant entered into
the construction contract with plaintiff, a non-licensed contractor. If defendant at the time of contracting for plaintiff's
services intended that the construction should serve any purpose other than one legitimately incidental to his farming
operation he violated the law. Is he taking the position now
that he confided such intention to plaintiff and conspired with
him to commit a crime~ How else can he prevail in his
defense?
If we construe the law fairly, and particularly if we give
any weight whatsoever to the presumption of innocence and
the rule of construction against extending a statute in order to
find guilt of crime (People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121,
143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Srnith (1955), 44 Cal.2d
77, 79 [2] [3] [279 P.2d 33], we should conclude that neither
plaintiff nor defendant was guilty of a crime in entering into
the contract. Section 7049, above quoted, does not require
that the "construction or operation" which is the subject
of exemption be conducted on land which is part of, or contiguous to, the parcel on which the crop is grown. The
exemption rather, by its express terms is inclusive of "any construction or operation incidental to . . . farmin(J, dairying
agricult1.trc, viticulture, horticulture . . . " (Italics added.)
The intention of the Legislature to grant a broad exemption
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extending throughout the area of farming and its incidental
operations appears clear. (See Kelly v. Hill (1951), 104 Cal.
App.2d 61, 65 [230 P.2d 864].) The word "agriculture,"
in its commonly accepted meaning, includes not only ''the
production of plants and animals useful to man [but also]
. . . to a variable extent the preparation of those products
for man's use and their disposal by marketing ... " CW ebster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition.) It
seems to me that the grain elevator, located exactly 'Where
it is, is part and parcel of defendant's farming operation.
At least there is no evidence sufficient to establish that plaintiff, in entering into the contraet with defendant, had knowledge or notice that the eontemplated construction ·was other
than incidental to defendant's farming operation. The elevator is not a part of the main farm crop growing area, hut
eertainly it is a part of the farm in the same sense that
harvesting the crop, collecting it, storing it and marketing
it are a part of and ineidental to farming. Surely the fart
that defendant, after performanee of the contraet by plaintiff,
rented some of the storage space in the elevator to third
persons should not be eonsidered as against plaintiff.
For the reasons above stated, I would reverse the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I coneur in the views expressed in the dissenting opm10n
of Mr. Justiee Schauer and for the reasons there stated and
also for the reasons stated in my eoneurring opinion in
Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845 at page 851 [256
P.2d 569], I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 15,
1957. Shenk, ,J., Carter, ,J., and Sehauer, ,J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

